1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 2 EASTERN DIVISION 3 4 5 JAMES GEMELAS, et al., 6 Plaintiffs, 7) Case No. 1:08CV236 vs. 8 THE DANNON COMPANY, Inc., 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE HONORABLE 13 JUDGE DAN A. POLSTER, JUDGE OF SAID COURT, 14 AND A JURY, ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23RD, 2010, 15 COMMENCING AT 12:00 O'CLOCK P.M. 16 17 18 19 Court Reporter: GEORGE J. STAIDUHAR 801 W. SUPERIOR AVE., 20 SUITE 7-184 CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 21 (216) 357-7128 22 23 24 25

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Case: 1:08-cv-00236-DAP Doc #: 74 Filed: 06/29/10 2 of 34. PageID #: 1593 1 **APPEARANCES:** 2 Parties present on behalf of Plaintiffs: 3 Timothy Blood, Esq. Jayne Goldstein, Esq. 4 Jonathan Stein, Esq. John R. Climaco, Esq. 5 D. Scott Kalish, Esq. Thomas O'Reardon, Esq. 6 James Gemelas, Esq. Frank E. Piscitelli, Jr., Esq. 7 8 Parties present on behalf of Defendants: 9 Angel Garganta, Esq. Mike Ungar, Esq. 10 Bruce Friedman, Esq. Nancy Dowling, Esq. 11 David Yeagley, Esq. Ken Strick, Esq. 12 13 Parties present on behalf of Objectors: 14 Edward Cochran, Esq. Edward Siegel, Esq. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: We are here on case 1:08CV236, Gemelas, et al versus Dannon Yogurt. We are here for a Fairness Hearing.

Counsel for Plaintiffs are here and counsel for Dannon, and I believe we have some counsel for objectors, and some of the objectors may be present. So the court reporter can hear, I would like anyone who wants to speak to go to the podium where the microphone is, please.

Before the Court is a proposed judgment, final order, and decree resolving this case. I would say by background the parties had done a considerable amount of work on this case before it was filed in this District. It previously was in federal court in California, and the parties did a great deal of discovery.

And then they mediated the case before a retired Federal Judge and had a proposed settlement, which was presented to me. I had several issues. I engaged the parties in a lengthy process, which led to some modifications of the proposed settlement, and they are reflected in the current proposal.

So this has been going on for a long period of time, and I am intimately involved with the process

and the contents of the proposed — the amended stipulation of settlement and the proposed judgment and all the appropriate orders. So for threshold matters, I am formally certifying the following class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3):

"All persons who purchased in the
United States the food products marketed and distributed
by Dannon under the brand names of Activia or Danactive,
including any variations formats, or line extensions
thereof" — that's referred to as the, quote, products
unquote "at any time up to the day notice is provided to
the class. Excluded from the class are Defendants,
officers, directors, and employees and those who
purchased the products for the purpose of resale."

In other words, this includes consumer purchasers other than defendants, officers, directors, and employees.

"Second, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a), I am finding that the Plaintiff in this litigation, Mr. Gemelas, is a member of the class. His claims are typical of the class, and he fairly and adequately protected the interests of the class throughout these proceedings in the litigation.

Accordingly, I am hereby appointing Mr. Gemelas as class representative.

"Third, having considered the factors setforth in Rule 23(g(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I am finding that class counsel have fairly and adequately represented the class for purposes of entering into and implementing this settlement, and therefore, I appoint class counsel as counsel to represent the settlement class members.

"Fourth, Exhibit B sets forth several individuals who have filed valid requests for exclusion, also known as optouts." These four individuals are therefore excluded: Patricia L. Marsheck,
M-a-r-s-h-e-c-k, Margate, Florida; Betty A. Darden,
D-a-r-d-e-n, in Osala, Florida; David W. Geist,
G-e-i-s-t, Sr., in Marifee, California; and Emojene,
E-m-o-j-e-n-e, Carver in Roxboro, North Carolina. So those four individuals will be excluded from the class because they filed valid and timely requests for exclusion.

Next, I am concluding that the distribution of the class notice that was accomplished by counsel constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances and fully satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the requirements of due process, and any other — Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1715 and any other applicable law. All right.

There were a number of objections that were filed by several objectors and their counsel. There were some briefs in opposition. The Court has reviewed all of them. I don't think I need to take up everyone's time. Going through that now, there may be a couple things I want to address.

One of the things raised was whether it may be appropriate to withhold some portion of the attorneys fees, to wait for a couple of things:

First, to make sure that counsel completes all of the work that is left to be done in the same diligent and conscientious way they have performed their duties so far and, second, to determine exactly how much monetary relief will actually go to class members. At this point we don't know. We have a very detailed claim procedure set up. I reviewed it.

I believe it is fair and appropriate, but no one really knows how many claims and what the total dollar amount will be, and certainly, one measure of determining the fairness and appropriateness of attorneys fees in a case like this is to measure it against the monetary relief to the class.

It is a little more complicated because here there is both monetary and non monetary relief, so I am not suggesting that the only measure is the monetary

relief but certainly that is one measure.

So I guess my thought was the attorneys fees, the settlement provides for attorneys fees up to \$10 million dollars, and my preliminary thought would be to award \$7 million dollars at this point and then consider additional attorneys fees when I make sure, first, everything has been concluded in the MDL and I am able to see what — how much monetary relief was obtained for the class, and then I will consider the balance. So I guess that was a tentative thought.

So that was one issue, and the second one that was raised by the objectors in the stipulated settlement, the parties have agreed that if the total amount of defendants payments is less than \$35 million dollars — and that includes attorneys fees and, well, I don't know, does that include the attorneys fees, or is that exclusive of attorneys fees, that total amount of payments?

MR. BLOOD: That's inclusive.

THE COURT: All right. That was my thought. The total amount is less than \$35. It could go as high as \$45 million, depending on the amount of claims, but if this provision — and it is Roman Numeral IV, capital A(3)(a), provides that "the total amount of payments is less than \$35 million dollars, then Defendant Dannon

shall donate products having a total value equal to the difference between the \$35 million and the amount of payments, pursuant to the cy pres doctrine to be distributed to one or more charities that help feed the poor."

A question was raised as to how this product would be valued, and I guess there are two ways: We could use the wholesale value or the retail value. The Court's preliminary inclination is to use the wholesale value but, also, to credit Dannon with any distribution or transportation expense incurred in transporting the products from Dannon's facilities to the charities that would receive the product.

So I guess I would like to hear from the Plaintiffs, from Dannon, and from any of the objectors on those two issues that I have raised.

MR. BLOOD: Good afternoon. Timothy Blood for the Plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Blood.

MR. BLOOD: First of all, I think it is perfectly appropriate for the Court to make an initial award of attorneys fees and then determine the remaining amount at a later time after the settlement concludes, we certainly have no objection to that, your Honor.

And I assume that any later discussion of

the amount would be until — would wait until after the process concludes.

THE COURT: That's my suggestion, Mr. Blood, that we wait until what we will call the claims process, so we will be able to know the total value, the economic value that is going to the class, certainly, along with all the other factors.

MR. BLOOD: Okay. Then we will hold off argument until then.

With regard to wholesale versus retail, if
the Court determines that it would be wholesale value, I
think the parties had an understanding they would be
retail value, but if it was wholesale value, then I
certainly think it would be appropriate to include costs
of distribution, transportation primarily because Dannon
doesn't distribute to these types of entities.

THE COURT: Right. Well, I would definitely include that. The provision doesn't — it doesn't specify it, so there may have been discussion among the parties, but this was my preliminary thought, but I would certainly include any distribution or delivery costs entailed by Dannon in getting the food products to the charities.

MR. BLOOD: And with regard to sort of a related issue of how that is all to be done, the parties

have been discussing it, and pursuant to the way in which cy pres awards are distributed anyway, at the close of the claims process, the parties intend to work on a distribution plan, a detailed distribution plan in this case and present it to the Court.

Obviously, that would detail based on how much value there is, based on how much product has to be distributed, who the awardees, the recipients will be, the amount, the timing and a distribution plan in enough detail to satisfy the Court, and that would obviously be done later on after we know how much money we are dealing with.

THE COURT: Okay. I guess I should have said, I know the objectors raised an issue as to whether this was an appropriate cy pres recipient. I have concluded that it is. It is an appropriate use of cy pres. The claims process ensures, quite frankly, that all the claimants, you know, even above the \$35 million, potentially up to \$45 million, the claims would be honored.

So we are only talking about the situation where the claims don't reach the \$35 million total threshold, and at that point, the claimants will have received whatever monetary relief they are entitled to, and I think distribution of food products to those

1 individuals in this country who are hungry is 2 appropriate. So I am making that finding. 3 MR. BLOOD: And we would agree and certainly 4 more appropriate than sending yogurt product to the 5 Better Business Bureau, which is what the objectors seem 6 to suggest, which I think would be -7 THE COURT: Well, I don't think 8 they suggested sending yogurt to the Better Business 9 I think the idea was some sort of monetary 10 contribution to the Better Business Bureau or entities 11 like that that provide benefit to consumers, and there 12 would be nothing inappropriate about that. 13 I don't think they were suggesting sending 14 the yogurt there. It was making a monetary compensation 15 to agencies, and there would be nothing wrong with that. 16 But there would be a great benefit to providing food to 17 people in need, and it would be appropriate. So I am 18 making that finding. 19 MR. BLOOD: And I have nothing else unless 20 your Honor — oh, expenses, also. 21 THE COURT: Oh, I should -- I am going to 22 award the expenses. I find the amount set forth in the 23 filings is reasonable and appropriate. It is 24 \$598,578.44, and I shall order those paid.

MR. BLOOD: And just to be clear, and those

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are paid at the same time that the \$7 million will be paid?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BLOOD: Thank you, your Honor.

And I have nothing else unless you have questions for us.

THE COURT: No. Yes, Mr. Ungar.

MR. UNGAR: Thank you, your Honor. I think I will be the briefest I have ever been in this courtroom. First, I want to thank the Court for its assistance throughout these matters. We have no objection or position with respect to the attorneys fees issue.

With respect to the distribution of product, we have no objection to the Court's suggestion that it be valued at a wholesale price with full credit to Dannon for all of the distribution costs and administration costs that are associated with this process, which is obviously out of the ordinary course of its normal business.

And then, finally, I would just point out that we will continue to work with Plaintiffs' counsel under the continuing jurisdiction and supervision of this Court with respect to the product distribution since it is clear that is going to materialize, and we will report

1 to the Court on a timely basis with a distribution plan. 2 And thank you. 3 Thank you, Mr. Ungar. THE COURT: 4 MR. UNGAR: Unless you have any questions. 5 THE COURT: No. That's fine. 6 Do any of the objectors or counsel for the 7 objectors wish to speak on any of these points? 8 MR. COCHRAN: Yes, your Honor. Good 9 Edward Cochran for objectors Falkner, afternoon. 10 Cochran, Cannata, Loeffler, Richey, Price, Henry, and 11 Lodwick. 12 Your Honor's addressing some of the 13 objections will very much shorten what I have to say. 14 Obviously, we agree with the addressing the two issues, 15 your Honor. I would have only three points to make 16 supplemental to that. 17 One, I would ask the Court to consider that, 18 as this settlement is nothing but a claims made 19 settlement or insurance against what claims might be made 20 and that indeed there might be very few claims. 21 might be many more claims than I think as well. 22 I mean, frankly, I don't know any more than 23 anyone else in this room, but I do know from many other 24 cases I have been in of 1 percent claim rates and 25 2 percent claim rates and so on; that in light of that,

that the parties and the Court should consider some kind of minimum cash payment, whatever it might be. And I know in our written suggestions we suggested \$25 million dollars, which is now zero. There is no minimum payment of cash whatsoever, other than \$10 million to the attorneys. That is the only cash that we know that will be paid.

THE COURT: Well, to whom would the cash be paid?

MR. COCHRAN: Your Honor, if there were a minimum you mean?

THE COURT: If there were --

MR. COCHRAN: If there was a minimum of \$10 million dollars, say, that should go to the cy pres, Better Business Bureau, whoever it might be in lieu of yogurt products, which would be of much more utility to any charitable or public interest organization. If such recipients were in this room, I feel confident that they would agree with me 110 percent.

The second suggestion, your Honor —

THE COURT: Well, I would just say,

Mr. Cochran, I understand your point, but the only

charities that are going to be receiving Dannon's food

products are those that can use those products. We are

not contemplating Dannon loading up their trucks full of

yogurt, driving around and leaving trailers full of yogurt in places. I mean it is going to be efficient and effective, and they will distribute enough of their product to reach the values required when we see what the monetary claims are that are paid and to as many charities as needed to make sure that all the food can be received, stored, and distributed, so there is not going to be any wasted food.

So in my view — presumably the charities — if you give cash, you know some of us do to Cleveland FoodBank, do, and they then purchase food, or they give the money to the subentities that buy the food. It is all converted into food. Here it is already in useful food products.

It is just a question of making sure that only so much is distributed because, of course, it is perishable, that it can be used in a timely fashion, and that is why there may be significant distribution expenses because we are not talking about, you know, canned foods that might have a shelf life of six months or more. So there will be a lot of mechanics, but I am confident the food products will be used.

MR. COCHRAN: I understand. And of course, that's a good point, your Honor. I am only trying to address what if, for example, there were not even a

million dollars claimed in money to the class. There should be some minimum in that event.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COCHRAN: And I continue — and we would like the permission of the parties and the Court, if it is available for the objectors, to stay involved in the case so as to represent some other monitoring force in addition to the Court of the details of what the Court has outlined as what I think is the best intentions..

THE COURT: Well, I don't think there is any additional monitoring or oversight. We have the lawyers, but ultimately, the monitoring and oversight is me. And I think I can accomplish the oversight myself, but I appreciate the offer.

MR. COCHRAN: Your Honor, the second point, in light of the Court having addressed my objections is what would happen to the money, if any, if attorneys fees ultimately are less than \$10 million dollars. We know the Defendant is prepared to pay \$10 million dollars, and in the end were the claims, the amount claimed by the class to be very low and possibly the Court were to order that the fees would not exceed lodestar or \$7 million, whatever, we would like to address the issue of whether that money should simply disappear back into the pockets of the Defendant, whether it be \$3 million or whatever or

whether that money should be addressed by the Court as a potential settlement.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Cochran, as I understand it, that differential, if there is one and if it arises, would be converted into cy pres food distribution because Dannon is committed to pay money and/or food valued at the wholesale price up to \$35 million dollars.

And at this point none of us know what the components will be. We don't the know — the agreement contemplates possibly claims well over \$25, \$30 million. We don't know. They could be, they could be small, no clue, but that's covered by the agreement. Just say hypothetically, if we have got \$20 million dollars in claims and the Court doesn't award any attorney fees beyond the \$7, you know, there is about \$8 million dollars of food.

If the Court orders \$10 million dollars of attorneys fees and we have got \$20 million dollars of claims, that's about \$5 million of food. If it is only a small number of claims, well, we have many, many millions of food that is distributed, but the money, under no circumstances will any reduction in attorneys fees inure to the benefit of Dannon.

If it would, that would have been a failure

of the process, and that isn't happening.

MR. COCHRAN: Well, of course, your Honor is correct, those are the terms of the settlement, but I think Dannon is much more wanting to expend product than they are cash, and I am just addressing the fact that pursuant to the clear sailing provision, they are willing to pay up to \$10 million dollars in cash, and since they are, I am simply interposing an objection, your Honor, that would address whether any reduction in attorneys fees would be conferred only into distribution of additional product as your Honor has described or whether the cy pres can be through objectors in this case, have the opportunity to seek a cash contribution, that's all and if your Honor disagrees —

THE COURT: So it would be a cash cy pres contribution —

MR. COCHRAN: Correct.

THE COURT: -- to someone.

All right. Well, that's sort of related to your prior objection, Mr. Cochran. I understand your point, but I have concluded the mechanism the parties have come to is fair and appropriate, but I understand the objection.

MR. COCHRAN: Thank you, your Honor. The final point is, as to the lodestar, your Honor has chosen

to distribute immediately \$7 million dollars, which is roughly the lodestar. Mr. Seigel will address in a moment our belief that the actual attorney time, as compared to clerks and investigators and so forth that are being included in the lodestar, the actual attorney time that has been submitted in the lodestar is, at least, a couple million dollars less than \$7 million dollars.

And we would like to put that into the

And we would like to put that into the record, and if the Court would like to address that, but I will let Mr. Seigel address the detailed numbers of that lodestar. With that, I shall sit down.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cochran. All right.

Mr. Seigel?

MR. SIEGEL: Thank you, your Honor.

Edward Siegel representing the same parties that

Mr. Cochran represents and also acting as co-counsel to

Ken Nelson who represents Denise Fairbank and

Darrell Palmer representing Steven Cope. Ms. Fairbank

and Ms. Cope are resting on their written objections and

have nothing further to add.

As Mr. Cochran indicated, in our objections, we talk about the fact that under the recent Kenny A

decision by the Supreme Court, that the lodestar — and only the lodestar — is the appropriate measure for attorneys fees in class actions.

I did a quick analysis of the attorneys — of the fee request and noted there was a case in Georgia, which was the Carpenter's Health and Welfare Benefit versus the Coca Cola Company, in which Kaufman Stoia, which was the predecessor to Robbins Geller, was involved.

In that case, the Court, Lois B. Hunt, said that you cannot include in your lodestar investigators, accountants, other people who are just staff. These are overhead, and they can not be included in lodestar.

And yet, in the affidavit that was submitted by Jonathan Stein of the \$4.6 million dollars claimed in lodestar only \$2.5 is for partners, associates, of counsel, and paralegal. That leaves \$2.1 million dollars for document clerks, interns, shareholder relations, information tech, and investigators, forensic accountants and others. These, according to, as I said, the Coke case, that's overhead. That is the responsibility of the law firm and should not be charged to the class.

If you subtract that from the \$7 million-dollar lodestar, you take off \$2.1 million for these — and these are rough numbers — the Poiscitelli

firm added about \$25,000 in similar non reimburseable costs and Shepherd Finkelman had about \$250,000 in such costs, so you really get a lodestar of \$4.5 million dollars.

We believe that that should be the lodestar, and that should be the amount that is awarded rather than the \$7 million dollars that they claim. I have nothing further, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Siegel, what document has that?

MR. SIEGEL: I am looking, your Honor, at document 67-3 filed on June 9th. It is 2 of 98. It is a declaration of Jonathan M. Stein in support of the Plaintiffs motion for final approval of settlement for attorneys fees and expenses and response to objections, and it is page ID No. 1097 is where it begins, but I am looking in particular at pages 1099, 1100, and 1101, and 54 percent of the \$4.6 million dollars is for partners associates of counsel and paralegals. The rest is for others.

THE COURT: Well, project attorney sounds —

I assume those are attorneys.

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, project attorneys are probably — this is something that has been criticized in many class action settlements — these are

contract employees who may get \$35 to \$50 an hour, and some of them are billed out at \$515 an hour.

The first one is Steven Allen, \$515. There is no evidence as to how much these people are paid.

They basically review documents, and in the Xerox case,

Carlson versus Xerox in the Second Circuit and the Tyco

case in New Hampshire, several of these contract

attorneys submitted affidavits as part of the public

record saying they were not supervised.

They basically did objective coding. They did not do lawyer-like work for perhaps a third of their time, and I think there are many cases that say just because the lawyer does the work, if it is ministerial in nature, he should not be rewarded at his full billable rate, but the others —

THE COURT: But the real issue is, what you are suggesting is if they are ostensibly billed at \$2, \$300 and more dollars an hour, they are getting paid a fraction of that. That would be inappropriate. If they are contract attorneys, this should be the contract amount.

MR. SIEGEL: Precisely, your Honor.

THE COURT: So I assume it is.

MR. SIEGEL: No, your Honor. I don't believe that these people are paid \$515 an hour. I have

no evidence — there was no evidence in the record indicating how much these people were actually paid, but I would be very surprised if they were actually paid at between \$290 and \$515 an hour.

THE COURT: I guess maybe I should find out because there is a large — forensic accountants and shareholder relations is really almost negligible compared to the total, but there is a large item for project attorney. It looks like it may exceed a million dollars if I add up all those entities. Who can enlighten me about project attorneys?

MR. BLOOD: I can, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Blood.

MR. BLOOD: The project attorneys were hired because of the large number of documents that we had to review for deposition and trial preparation in a very short amount of time based on the schedule set by the Central District of California.

Their lawyers, the rates are based on their number of years in practice, and they are generally lower rates than what an associate would be billed out at or a partner would be billed out at a firm. It depends on the project lawyers. Steve Allen is essentially a salaried person. He receives a salary amount like an associate would, and then he is billed out at an hourly rate like

an associate or partner would.

And then some of the other people because of the amount of documents we had to review in a very short amount of time were people paid on an hourly basis. I don't recall what the amount of hourly rate was, but it was certainly less than what the billable rate was because that's how law firms make money, is they pay their attorneys less money than what they bill them out at, and that way it covers overhead and —

THE COURT: Well, I understand and that's for employees, but normally, if these are contract employees, you have very little overhead for them. You may not pay benefits. You may not have all the associated overhead you have with an employee.

MR. BLOOD: And with the Kaufman-Stoia firm — well, it depends. I mean, what happens, particularly with a bad economy is at the Kaufman-Stoia firm and then my new firm, there are people who will work part-time but essentially year round on projects doing document review. The nature of our business is document intensive. It is subjective coding that needs lawyers to look at, and those do have overhead costs.

We, of course, didn't brief this issue because Mr. Siegel never raised it. So we are a bit sandbagged. It is not like Mr. Siegel noticed this for

the first time. His practice is to follow the Kaufman-Stoia firm around and make the same objections over and over again. We were not expecting this to be addressed, but if we had, we certainly would have provided the Court with case law justifying the practice.

But some of these lawyers were hired just for this project, but a number of these lawyers are essentially on staff all the time and go from case to case as needed. So there are overhead costs associated with those folks. Steve Allen has a desk and phone and e-mail and all those other types of things.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I am satisfied they are lawyers. The billing rates were quite high for everyone, but I know the billing rates are quite high, and they are higher outside of Cleveland than in Cleveland, and a lot of this litigation was conducted in California. I think most of the actual litigation was in California.

By the time it got to Ohio, we weren't taking depositions, documents had already been gone through, so this was primarily California. I know rates are much higher in California.

Well, there is, you know, this small amount for information techs and a total of maybe \$10,000 for a few interns, a little bit for document clerks. I find

1 that it is a very, very, very small amount of the \$7 plus 2 million dollars. So I don't consider it a major issue in 3 awarding reasonable attorneys fees. 4 All right. I guess lastly, the objectors 5 had made a motion or request for attorneys fees for them. 6 And the last thing I am interested in is sort of 7 satellite litigation over this but no amount was 8 suggested. I mean, I have considered everything the 9 objectors have said. I rejected most of it but 10 incorporated a couple of their points in some of the 11 modifications I have made. 12 So Mr. Siegel, Mr. Cochran, now, the 13 issue — you raised it — have you determined what you 14 would ask for. 15 MR. COCHRAN: May I, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Yes? 17 MR. COCHRAN: Your Honor, in my written 18 objections, I have not requested any fee. 19 THE COURT: All right. Okay. 20 Well, I quess, Mr. Siegel was? I thought 21 from one of you, I quess it was Mr. Siegel. 22 MR. SIEGEL: Yes, your Honor. That was in 23 the objection filed by Ken Nelson, and I believe that our

feeling is that if we have contributed to the Court's

understanding of the entire case and have helped clarify

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some things that were perhaps somewhat murky, that we should be entitled to a fee based on the Court's — in the Court's discretion. There is no particular number that we have thought of. It could, of course, be lodestar. It could be —

THE COURT: Well, in terms of hours expended, how many hours did you expend? See, I wouldn't know that, so it would be inappropriate for me to just quess.

MR. SIEGEL: And, your Honor, rather than me guess Mr. Nelson's time, with the Court's permission, I would like to defer that for a few hours to call Mr. Nelson and check. I know what my time is, and I can find out Mr. Palmer's.

THE COURT: I will tell you what,

Mr. Siegel, I am not saying what I will do. I don't know
what I will do, but it is appropriate for me to

consider — I am not going to reject a request before it
is made or sort of guess what it is because that would be
appropriate.

If you are requesting attorneys fees and now that you know essentially what the Court has done, if you want to make a request, you can make one and document it, and I will consider it. And I will let obviously the Plaintiffs and Dannon file anything they wish, and we

1 will deal with it in an orderly fashion, and I will make 2 a decision on it. I think that's the way to do it. 3 MR. SIEGEL: Thank you, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Rather than having people do it 5 on the fly, it is better to do it orderly. 6 MR. SIEGEL: How quickly would you like 7 that, your Honor? THE COURT: I would say within a week. 8 9 MR. SIEGEL: Fine. Within seven days I will 10 have something to you, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. SIEGEL: Thank you. 13 THE COURT: All right. Well, I think we are 14 pretty well concluded. 15 I have considered all of the objections, 16 most have been rejected, but I have incorporated some of 17 them in my rulings. I would say this has been a very 18 complex class action because, first, the allegations were 19 very complex, and litigation was very uncertain. 20 I don't know how ultimately this would have 21 been decided had it been litigated because it had --22 Dannon had made some claims about the -- what I will call 23 the health benefits of some of its products, and the 24 Plaintiffs had challenged those representations, and 25 there has been a lot of scientific studies about the use

of Dannon's products.

The parties briefed me on this. I read a lot of material. So the outcome was quite uncertain, and that's why a lot of time, legal time was spent and why the attorneys' are high, and the outcome was uncertain. And so it made sense for the parties to settle this case. It made sense for the Plaintiffs to settle it.

Again, because one of the complexities was that Dannon had offered a moneyback guarantee for many of its products that were the subject of the dispute if within, I believe, two weeks Plaintiff didn't note some improvement in his or her general feeling, wellbeing, whatever, he or she could get his or her money-back.

So we had that, and it was never clear how many Plaintiffs felt that their general health or comfort or wellbeing was improved or how many didn't and exactly what the science of Dannon's claims were, so that would have been very protracted and uncertain.

Second, there is a very important part of the relief, the — what I will call the injunctive portion — that Dannon made some significant modifications in its advertising and packaging for a period up to three years, and the Court spent a lot of time with the parties on that because I was concerned about that and about how it would appear if a settlement

with a Federal District Court Judge's name on it approved certain language, that someone might say, well, it is essentially Court approved. So we spent a lot of time with that, and there was back and forth, and there were compromises.

So I am saying all of this to highlight, one, the complexity of this case, the uncertainty, the outcome had the case been litigated, and that's why I think the settlement is fair and appropriate. It does provide monetary relief, and Plaintiffs can get a modest monetary relief without just on their say so.

It certainly is appropriate to require some proof of purchase for anything over a small base level.

I think any class action settlement I have ever seen has required some proof of purchase. That's to avoid fraud.

So I don't think the requirements here are onerous or any different than the class action settlements I have seen.

So all that is by way of saying that I think the settlement is fair and appropriate, and I am approving it with a couple of modifications that we dealt with today.

So I am also going to award that the Plaintiff, Mr. Gemelas, and any Plaintiff who has been deposed is entitled to an incentive award of \$7,500, and any Plaintiff who has not been deposed is entitled to an

incentive award of \$1,000, and I am hereby dismissing 1 2 with prejudice this action and all released claims 3 against each and all released persons and entities and 4 without cost to any of the parties as against the others. 5 So I think I covered everything I need to 6 cover, but this is fairly complex. So, Mr. Blood, 7 Mr. Ungar, any other counsel, is there anything that you 8 feel I need to cover on the record that I haven't 9 covered? 10 MR. BLOOD: I don't believe so, your Honor. 11 MR. UNGAR: Ditto. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Cochran? 13 MR. COCHRAN: There is one clarification, 14 your Honor, with respect to the request. 15 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Cochran. 16 MR. COCHRAN: With reference to the decision 17 of future attorneys fees, is the Court requiring 18 disclosure of, A, the claims data and, B, the rates and 19 payments for project attorneys? 20 THE COURT: Well, I had the rates for 21 project attorneys. 22 MR. COCHRAN: I mean, the rates they are 23 actually paid. 24 THE COURT: Well, I believe that many of 25 these people are actually employees. All right? They

are full or part-time employees. So they are essentially treated like associates. So the rates seem to be in line with associates. They are actually in most cases less than associates.

So considering it is California, that will just — I will just go with that. I am going to require a report, and I think I would see it, a report as to the total amount of claims, how that process has gone, and then what the total amount is and what, if any, food contribution.

So I would just expect class counsel to make that report to me at the end of the claims process, and then I will consider any future application for attorneys fees.

MR. COCHRAN: Your Honor, will that claims data be made available to objectors?

THE COURT: Well, it will be filed. I will ask Mr. Blood to file it, and at the end of the process — I don't need every minute detail, but just say we had X claims totaling X dollars. And so those have been paid, and Dannon is going to pay, you know, distribute the amount of food. So that's what we will have. And it will be filed, and anyone can see it.

MR. COCHRAN: That's perfect, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Then I want to thank all counsel who have appeared today and have worked very hard on this. I was glad I was able to assist the parties, complete the complex settlement process you had engaged in and with the substantial help of retired Judge Tevrizian, and I am glad we were able to move forward on this. So I thank everyone for their hard work and for appearing today. So with that, we are adjourned. MR. CLIMACO: Thank you, hour Honor. THE COURT: And Mr. Climaco, I hope your neck improves. MR. CLIMACO: Thank you, your Honor. It is improving considerably. (Hearing concluded at 1:09 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE

I, George J. Staiduhar, Official Court
Reporter in and for the United States District Court,
for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division,
do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true
and correct transcript of the proceedings herein.

s/George J. Staiduhar
George J. Staiduhar,
Official Court Reporter

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